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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on the explanations for the often observed
phenomenon of the electoral success of corrupt politicians. It focuses on the particular
case of the Portuguese municipality of Oeiras, where Isaltino Morais was elected as
mayor after being convicted for corruption-related crimes. We collected data on 557
residents of the municipality. Data were collected four weeks after the October 2017
election. We find no evidence for the ignorant voter explanation but strong support for
the implicit trading theory.
1 Introduction
Corruption is a recurring phenomenon all over the world, in all forms and levels of government.
It can be defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (TI 2016). There are
different types of corruption, classified according to the frequency with which it occurs, the
sector involved, and the amount of money affected. It may range from petty corruption,
which is sporadic and involves lower-level government officials, to grand corruption, which
occurs at the highest levels of government, and is usually facilitated through complex financial
operations. Lastly, there is political corruption, which happens when a government official
takes advantage of her position to systematically manipulate policies, institutions or rules for
personal gain.
The costs of corruption are severe and widespread. In the European Union, between
e179 billion and e990 billion in GDP are lost annually due to corruption (Hafner et al.
2016). Another study places the global annual cost of bribery alone at about $1 trillion
(Kaufmann 2005), an estimate that does not include the cost of other corrupt activities or
of the illegal practices that are usually associated with corruption, such as bid rigging, fraud
or money laundering.
The abuse of public office has a direct detrimental effect on GDP per capita, GDP growth
and welfare.1 Empirical evidence reveals that it also has an indirect effect on growth and
income through, for instance, deterring investment and harming the business sector.2 Fur-
thermore, corruption prevents inclusive growth, as it is associated with increased income
1Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004; Mauro 1995; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002; Welsch 2008.
2Mauro 1995; Wei 2000, Ciocchini, Durbin, and Ng 2003, Dreher and Herzfeld 2005, Tanzi and Davoodi
2001, Méon and Sekkat 2005
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inequality and lower income growth for the poor.
Corruption both allows for wasteful spending and weakens the state’s capacity to collect
taxes, resulting in lower government revenue. This raises the cost of public investment
and reduces the quality of public infrastructure and services, ultimately at the cost of the
environment and of the population’s health and education.3
Lastly, the manipulation of public offices for private purposes impairs democratic rep-
resentation, undermines trust in the government and in the legitimacy of the democratic
institutions and weakens citizens’ trust in one another (Anderson and Tverdova 2003), po-
tentially creating conflict, violence and civil disorder.
Corruption can be understood as an agency problem. The principal (the voter) entrusts
the agent (the politician) with the authority to make decisions on her behalf, but does not
have full control or monitoring power over the agent’s actions. The asymmetry of information
creates incentives for the agent to act according to her own interest. Unless preferences are
perfectly aligned, the agent will not act in the principal’s best interest.
Hence, there is the need to create a structure of incentives such that the politician acts
in accordance with the citizens’ preferences. The politician will do so depending on the costs
of violating the delegation relationship. In turn, the costs are dependent on the probability
and consequences of being caught. Monitoring mechanisms, which increase the availability
of information and thus the probability of being caught, as well as punishing mechanisms,
that do not allow for misbehaviour to go unpunished, are fundamental to tackle corruption
(Winters, Testa, and Fredrickson 2012).
One such mechanism is elections. Firstly, citizens have the right to choose who holds
political power and are motivated to keep off office those who do not act in their interest.
Secondly, politicians will not engage in corrupt behaviors that compromise their electoral
success. However, on several occasions, elections fail in being "a tool to select and discipline
politicians" (Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and Rivero 2016 p.17), as allegations or even con-
victions of corrupt behavior do not determine the end of nor deeply harm a political career.
In all fairness, there is evidence of electoral retribution, of electors’ punishing misbehaving
candidates by not voting for them. In the United States congressional elections, charges of
3Mauro 1998, Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002; Welsch (2004); Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006
Locatelli et al. 2017; Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson 2000
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corruption resulted in a 6 to 11% decrease in the expected vote share (Peters and Welch 1980,
Welch and Hibbing 1997). As a general rule, electoral retribution tends to be rather modest:
in Japan, "scandal-tainted" legislators lost 1% of the electorate; in the United Kingdom,
members of parliament implicated in an expenses abuse scandal suffered, on average, a 1.5%
loss in vote share (Reed 1999, Eggers and Fisher 2011).
Consequently, more often than not, electoral retribution does not prevent implicated
office-holders from being re-elected. Empirical record shows that being accused of such
violations can have a mild effect on election possibilities (Golden 2006; Fernández-Vázquez,
Barberá, and Rivero 2016) and the majority of corrupt candidates have a safety net of
sufficient size that such a downturn doesn’t mean the loss of office. In the US Congress,
75% of the candidates facing corruption charges were elected. In Japan, 64.6%. This leads
Golden (2006) to conclude that “the modal corrupt politician is successfully reelected despite
charges, or even convictions, of illegal behavior” (p.8).
The local elections of the Portuguese municipality of Oeiras are an example of the elec-
toral success of a candidate that has been convicted for crimes concerning corruption, Isaltino
Morais. Isaltino, as he is commonly referred to, was able to get re-elected when the accu-
sations of corrupt practices first surfaced, during the time of his trial, and, more recently,
after serving his prison sentence for corruption related crimes. By focusing on the particular
case of Oeiras, a municipality with one of the wealthiest, most educated populations of Por-
tugal, this study attempts to investigate what explains, given the costs and unpopularity of
corruption, the electoral success of corrupt politicians.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews previous
literature, while the third section presents an overview of the Portuguese local governance and
the Oeiras’ case. The fourth section explains the design of the survey-embedded experiment.
The fifth section describes the collected data, and results are presented in the sixth and
seventh sections. The eight section concludes.
2 Existing literature
Regarding individual attitudes towards politicians, the most consensual explanations for the
paradox of "unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians” (Kurer 2001 p.63) can be
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grouped into two categories: the ignorant voter theory and the implicit trading theory.
The ignorant voter theory suggest that voters support corrupt politicians simply because
they are not aware of the elected official’s behavior. In this case, the support of such politi-
cians is due to imperfect information on the levels and consequences of corruption, i.e., an
agency problem.
Scholars have tested this hypothesis by providing information on the politician’s conduct
and analyzing the voters’ response. The aim of this kind of experiments is to understand if
eliminating information asymmetries can have an impact on the level of corruption through
a retrospective mechanism, causing citizens to select out of corrupt politicians, versus a
prospective mechanism, where politicians opt to be less corrupt fearing not being elected
(Winters, Testa, and Fredrickson 2012). Results of such experiments are not consensual.
On the one hand, there is evidence that indicates that information can be a strong antidote
against the support of misbehaving officeholders. Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) find that
the typical Brazilian is sensitive to corruption and would not choose a hypothetical corrupt
candidate. On another study, also in Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2008) analyze the effects
of federal government audits of municipal records, which showed financial irregularities and
diversion of funds, on electoral results. They find evidence of “massive voter retaliation”: an
audit revealing corruption would worsen electoral performance by 7 to 14 percentage points.
On the other hand, other studies have found modest or even unexpected effects. In Mex-
ico, an information campaign on the incumbent’s misbehavior, led to a decline in her party’s
vote share, which was, according to the authors, due to a decrease in turnout of an average
of 6 percentage points (Chong et al. 2014). In Brazil, providing information on corruption
charges in a particular local election where both candidates were implicated resulted in a loss
in support for one candidate but not for the other (De Figueiredo, Hidalgo, and Kasahara
2010). In this experiment, turnout depressed by 1.2%, which is all the more noteworthy, as
voting is mandatory in Brazil. These experiments’ common result, the decrease in partici-
pation, suggests that the treatments increased distrust in the power of vote. This could be
expected in the Brazilian case, because both candidates were facing corruption charges, but
in the Mexican election it shows that information did not urge the voters to throw the rascal
out by voting for the non-corrupt candidate, but by passively removing themselves from the
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electoral process. Information seems to have resulted in less government accountability.
Winters, Testa, and Fredrickson (2012) advocate that an effective informational treatment
must be salient, credible and accessible. Ferraz and Finan’s (2008) analysis shows that
accessibility of information, which in their experiment meant the existence of a local radio
station that spread the audit results, increases electoral retribution.
Information must be credible for the voter to act on it. Often corruption allegations come
from an opponent candidate or party, leading individuals to discount it as a partisan trick.
Because of this, Rundquist, Strom, and Peters (1977) defend that "only when the corruption
message arises from a source outside the electoral setting is it likely to be given credibility"
(p. 955). Ferraz and Finan (2008) also attribute the success of the treatment to the nature
of information, government audits, and not allegations, scandals or unverified accusations.
Nonetheless, even when information originates from independent and reliable sources, voters
may deliberately ignore it because they believe that all politicians are, at some level, corrupt.
Finally, to select out a corrupt politician, voters must understand the consequences and
costs of such behaviors. Klasnja (2011) finds that politically aware voters are, on average, less
likely elect corrupt politicians than their less informed counterparts, due to greater knowledge
and better understanding of incumbents’ involvement in corruption. The author defends that
dishonest politicians are able to maintain public support partly because large sections of the
electorate have a low level of political awareness.
Voters may exchange their vote and political support for explicit benefits provided by
the politician. "Pork barrel politics" is often expected to be behind the electoral success
of dishonest officeholders. However, as Rundquist, Strom, and Peters (1977) point out, to
establish a network of exclusive provision of goods to specific voters demands an overly
complex organization, difficult to put into practice. Furthermore, attempts at establishing
clientistic networks may lead voters away from politicians (Konstantinidis and Xezonakis
2013) or can be largely dependent on institutional settings (Manzetti and Wilson 2007).
Implicit trading does not require explicit dealings, i.e., the voter supports a candidate
gaining from her election a benefit that is not explicitly agreed upon. When voting, the citizen
might find the candidate’s honesty so important that any corruption allegation retrieves vote
intention. However, the voter might also take into account other aspects of the candidate
5
against the seriousness of the corruption charges, such as her party or stance on an important
issue, personality or her ability to provide economic benefits. This balancing act might explain
the electoral success of such candidates. Since there is no explicit conversation, there is a
much larger pool of possible voters when comparing to explicit trading, allowing politicians
not to suffer electoral reprisals for their misbehavior.
In Rundquist, Strom, and Peters’ (1977) experiment, political stances were shown to
be the most important reason behind supporting a corrupt politician: if individuals were
strongly pro or contra a certain policy issue, they were more likely to keep supporting a
hypothetical corrupt candidate that shared their stand on that issue.
In an experimental setting, Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013) find evidence of parti-
san bias, that is, individuals were more tolerant to corruption cases when it affected their
preferred party. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) show that the negative effect of corruption
on evaluations of the political system was significantly attenuated among supporters of the
incumbent political authorities. Partisanship seems to increase the likelihood of voting for
a corrupt politician, while political awareness appears to have the opposite effect. However,
there is not a consensus on the effects of the two features being simultaneously present. While
Klasnja (2011) finds that partisanship diminishes the positive association between political
sophistication and the electoral sanctioning of corrupt politicians, Anduiza, Gallego, and
Muñoz (2013) defend that high political awareness moderates the partisan bias, decreasing
the chances of electing a corrupt politician.
Finally, the trade-off hypothesis advocates that voters accept a certain level of corruption
if the politician is able to create favorable economic conditions. Evidence both for and
against this hypothesis has been found. Providing tangible benefits (tax cuts) seemed to
outweigh costs of political corruption and increase propensity to vote for a hypothetical
corrupt politician by 8% in Greece. In a similar experiment in Brazil, performing public
works would not improve chances to win (Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013, Winters and
Weitz-Shapiro 2013).
Another study looked at real corruption cases in Spanish elections to evaluate the impact
of the incumbent’s performance on the electoral results. Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and
Rivero (2016) show that while there was evidence of electoral retribution (corrupt local
executives were punished in elections by an average decrease of 1.8 percent in the vote share)
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dishonest politicians that increase economic welfare, allowing the constituents to benefit from
corruption, “survived the verdict of elections unharmed” (p.24).4 Misbehaving politicians
that did not improve welfare suffered an average loss of 4.2%.
Golden (2006) argues that it is more reasonable to expect electoral retribution in local
elections because mayors are executive officials that can affect the quantity and quality of
services, while a national level politician being voted out of office for dishonest behavior has
no immediate impact on national policy or on the overall degree of corruption tolerated by
the governing party. Still, one can also argue that the executive power of the mayor may
lead constituents to believe they can benefit from it.
Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and Rivero’s (2016) experiment shows evidence of an expla-
nation of Kurer (2001) for the electoral support of corrupt politicians: voters have inconsistent
preferences. The author defends that while voters believe that corruption is materially dis-
advantageous and morally repugnant and express their feeling in anti-corruption statements,
at the same time they believe that it is beneficial and morally justified to take advantage of
the opportunity when it arises.
Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and Rivero (2016) further argue that, in this case, cor-
ruption becomes a collective action problem. As Kurer (2001) puts it, although the best
possible outcome is to have non-corrupt politics, the worst is to have the corrupt politician
win, not having supported her and thus being shut from the clientistic distribution network.
While everyone would benefit clean politics, no single person has incentives to act against it,
resulting in the election of a corrupt politician.
3 Portuguese local governance
Portuguese local government is composed of two autonomous regions, municipalities and
freguesias (civil parishes).5 There are 308 municipalities, 278 in mainland Portugal and 30 in
the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira. The municipality is in charge of promoting
4The authors considered licensing construction on non-developable land or in environmental protected
areas as welfare increasing corrupt behaviours, while fraud in procurement, embezzlement, illegal hiring of
municipal personnel or blackmail were defined as welfare decreasing.
5These were formally established by the 1976 Constitutionof the Portuguese Republic (articles 249 through
254).
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the well-being of the resident population.6
The representative branches of each municipality are the Municipal Council and Municipal
Assembly (Câmara Municipal and Assembleia Municipal). The Council is the executive
branch, in charge of the governance of the municipality and responsible for the elaboration
and implementation of local policies. The Assembly serves as the deliberative branch that
monitors the activity of the Council and approves the general framework for its policies.
The local governing bodies serve four-year terms. Citizens registered in each municipality
are called to vote on the same day for party or independent lists presented for each of the
three representative branches, the Municipal Council, the Municipal Assembly and the Parish
Council. Votes are transformed into mandates using the d’Hondt method.7
The Council is composed by members of different parties or independent lists, elected
through direct universal secret suffrage, in proportional representation elections. The mayor
is the first candidate of the most voted list. Regarding the Assembly, part of its members
are elected directly by voters according to proportional representation while the remaining
seats are held by the presidents of the municipality’s Parish Councils.
The mayor plays a key role in the local government. She presides over the Municipal
Council, coordinates its activity, executes its deliberations, and assigns task to fellow council
members. The mayor has managerial autonomy in some of her responsibilities, such as man-
agement of human resources, management and maintenance of the patrimony, authorization
of contracts, permits, and others. Additionally, she is able to decide, within the plan of activ-
ities, which public works to implement and when, and to influence the choice of capital good
suppliers, making her a principal decision-maker in the allocation of resources anf investment
in the municipality.
The Oeiras case
As of 2016, 174.249 people inhabited the 45.9km2 that constitute Oeiras, making it the fifth
most densely populated municipality in Portugal (Pordata 2016). Oeiras shares borders with
6The 169/99 and 75/13 laws define the competences and areas of intervention of the local power and
representative branches. It is responsible for the organization of the territory, economic development, social
welfare, environment, and the task of providing local public goods and services such as water, transportation,
housing, health care, education, sports and culture, besides municipal police and civil protection.
7The d’Hondt method is a highest averages method for allocating seats in a party-list proportional repre-
sentation. It tends to favour the parties that gain the most votes.
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the municipalities of Lisbon on the east, Amadora and Sintra on the north, and Cascais on
the west. It enjoys a privileged geographic location as it is part of the Lisbon metropolitan
area and has over 10 km of coastline along the Tagus estuary. Its territory is divided into
five civil parishes.8
The proximity to the country’s capital led Oeiras to grow, in the past, as a dormitory
town and as a passage to the neighboring Cascais. However, in recent decades, Oeiras has
developed beyond a traditional suburb, becoming a municipality of importance in its own
right. For instance, it is now a destination of reference for tech enterprises, hosting the
highest proportion of medium-high to high tech companies, which are located in the many
science and technology parks of the municipality.9 Oeiras’ workers have the highest average
monthly base remuneration of the country, e920 higher than the national minimum wage of
e485 (Pordata 2013).
Oeiras is renowned for the quality of life, wealth and education of its population. The
per capita purchasing power of the Oeirenses is 57.1 percent above the Portuguese average,
a value which is inferior only to the country’s largest cities of Lisbon and Oporto (Pordata
2015) and 20.7% above the European average, positioning Oeiras bellow Germany and above
Belgium and the United Kingdom (INE 2015).10 The Oeirenses are one of the most educated
populations in Portugal. According to the 2011 census, 30.7% of the inhabitants hold a
bachelor’s degree, which is over twice the Portuguese average (13.8%). Oeiras comes in second
place, following Lisbon (31.1%). Most notably, only one in every five Oeiras’ inhabitants has
little to no schooling.11 In Lisbon, over a quarter (27.17%) of the population has such a
schooling level, and at national level it accounts for 35.2% of the population. Finally, the
Oeiras municipality was the only one, in 2011, where over half of the population (53%) had
completed at least high-school, which compares to a national average of 30.5% and 49.1% for
Lisbon (Pordata 2013).
8The five civil parishes of Oeiras are: União das Freguesias de Algés, Linda-a-Velha e Cruz-
Quebrada/Dafundo; UF de Carnaxide e Queijas; UF de Oeiras e São Julião da Barra, Paço de Arcos e
Caxias; Junta de Freguesia de Barcarena; and JF de Porto Salvo
9According to the location of the company’s headquarter (INE 2016).
10Per capita purchasing power is a composite measure, based on a matrix of 16 variables, that intends to
express the population’s material well-being. The comparison with European countries is obtained from the
estimation of the Portuguese purchasing power as 76.8% of the European average.
11It is considered "little" schooling have completed only primary school (four years of education).
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Oeiras is today an economic pivot. It is one of the most financially independent munic-
ipalities, collecting 77.3% of its revenue (Carvalho et al. 2016). Some attribute the growth
of Oeiras to its mayor, Isaltino Morais, who has presided the City Council since 1985 (with
the exception of the years during which he served as a minister, the period in which he was
imprisoned and the following years).
Political history and Isaltino Morais
Isaltino Morais first ran for mayor of Oeiras in 1985, heading the list of the center-right
Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD). He was successfully elected, and
re-elected every following four years, in 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001.
In 2002, he suspended his mandate as a mayor to become Minister of Cities, Spatial
Planning and Environment after being appointed by then prime minister Durão Barroso.
This appointment would not last long, as just a year later Isaltino resigned due to the
surfacing of news articles claiming he owned bank accounts in Switzerland and Belgium,
with capital that had not been declared to the fiscal authorities (Público 2003).
It later became known that, between 1990 and 2002, Isaltino owned a bank account in
Switzerland with over e1.1 million, while in this period he had earned a total net salary of
e351,139.82 and had not engage in any other paid activity (Sábado 2009).
Due to the accusations, PSD withdrew its support for the candidature of Isaltino for the
2005 local elections. Isaltino proceeded to create his own independent movement, a group of
citizen voters called Oeiras Mais À Frente (IOMAF), and to win with 34.2% of the votes.12
In August of 2009, the then Oeiras mayor was sentenced to seven years of prison, a
compensation of e463 thousand and loss of mandate, for the crimes of passive corruption,
misuse of power, fiscal fraud and money laundering (Público 2009). He appealed and stayed
as Oeiras mayor, being re-elected the following October with an even larger vote share than
in the previous election (41.52%).
One year later, his sentence was reduced to two years of effective imprisonment and a
compensation of e197 thousand, for three crimes of fiscal fraud and one of money laundering,
acquitting the defendant of the remaining crimes, with the exception of the passive corruption
12Here and further on the election results refer to the Municipal Council elections (SGMAI 2017).
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crime that was proved in court but had to be re-trialed due to an irregularity in the procedure.
By then, the 1996 crime had prescribed (Jornal de Notícias 2012).
In 2013, the Constitutional Court refused the last of a total of 44 appeals that Isaltino’s
defence presented during his process and, on April 24th, the mayor of Oeiras was arrested
and imprisoned at the Prison of Carregueira (Público 2013).
In the local elections of October of that same year, Paulo Vistas, who had been Isaltino’s
campaign manager and vice-president of the Municipal Council in the two previous mandates,
headed the IOMAF movement and won the elections with 33.45% of the votes. On election
night, news outlets reported Paulo Vistas’ supporters celebrating this victory outside the
prison where Isaltino was being held (Jornal de Notícias 2013).
In June of 2014, Isaltino was released to serve the remainder of his sentence in parole.
When the time came for the 2017 elections the main prospects to win the Oeiras mayor’s
office were Paulo Vistas, heading the IOMAF citizen’s movement that had been created by
Isaltino, and the man himself, now leading a recently founded citizens’ movement called
Inovar Oeiras de Volta (IN-OV).
On a national level, the 2017 local elections were marked by the return to the race of
many candidates that had been in office through many mandates, in what the news outlets
called “the return of the dinosaurs” (Jornal i 2017). Of these many "dinosaurs" only Isaltino
was re-elected to office. His movement won 41.65% of the votes for the Municipal Council,
which granted absolute majority of seats, and 38.12% of the votes for Municipal Assembly.
The case of Isaltino is not especially rare in Portuguese local government. Fátima
Felgueiras, Valentim Loureiro e Avelino Ferreira Torres are three examples of mayors that
were involved in corruption scandals and were later re-elected. The case of Isaltino Morais
is exceptional because of how long the politician has been in power, and, most importantly,
because Oeiras is an exceptional Portuguese municipality.
In Portugal, recent years have been marked by high-profile corruption cases implicating
ministers (or former ministers), and even a former prime minister, along with other nationally
recognized figures. The country is ranked as the 29th least corrupt country of the 176 con-
sidered in the Corruption Perception Index of 2016 (TI 2016). Regarding Europe, Portugal
is the 14th least corrupt country, placed in the middle of the list.
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Absolution, prescription of crimes or the abandonment of prosecution due to lack of
evidence are the norm when it comes to corruption cases. A study of reported corruption in
Portugal found that the majority of cases between 2004 and 2008 were closed (Lima 2011).
Only 14 of the 838 cases (1.7%) resulted in convictions leading Sousa (2016) to declare that
"every time the agent of passive corruption holds an elected position, the probability of being
convicted is close to zero" (p.21).
4 Data Collection
The aim of this study was to take advantage of the election of a candidate who had been
imprisoned for corruption-related crimes to test the main existent theories for the electoral
success of corrupt politicians - ignorant voter theory and the implicit trading theory.13 In
order to do so, a survey-embedded experiment was conducted.
Surveys were conducted online and through face-to-face interviews, in various places of
the five parishes of Oeiras, over the course of three weeks in November 2017. Total number
of survey respondents amounted to 557: 301 online surveys and 256 face-to-face interviews.
Firstly, we collected information on the individual. Following that, the subject was asked
to distribute nine points between honesty and competence according to the importance she
attributed to these being qualities of the ideal mayor or of the ideal politician. The motivation
was to understand each voter’s trade-off point between honesty and competence, which of the
two she valued the most, and to what extent. Throughout the whole survey honesty was
defined as "not accepting bribes and not peddling political favours" and competence was
described as "delivering to the population the bundle of goods and services it desires, at a
suitable level".
In the second part of the survey, the experiment was conducted. One of three types of
news articles (treatments) was provided to half of the subjects:
1. Honesty News: news about the corruption crimes, the trial and the arrest of Isaltino;
2. Competence News: news pieces concerning the Oeiras’ economic and social situation;
13Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013, Ferraz and Finan 2008, Chong et al. 2014, De Figueiredo, Hidalgo,
and Kasahara 2010, Rundquist, Strom, and Peters 1977, Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013, Klasnja 2011,
Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013, Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and
Rivero 2016
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3. Placebo News: news articles on an issue non-related to the study (the importance and
benefits of physical exercise), to understand if receiving any type of news articles would
have an effect on the subjects’ answers.
After reading the news articles, the respondents were asked to evaluate four politicians
based on their honesty and competence in a scale of 1 to 4. The politicians were: Isaltino
Morais, Paulo Vistas (Oeiras mayor from 2013 till 2017, and the main contestant at the 2017
elections), Fernando Medina (Lisbon’s mayor, who came into office in 2015 and had been
recently reelected, supported by the Socialist Party) and Carlos Carreiras (who has been the
Cascais’ mayor since 2011 and is supported by the Social Democratic Party).
As Medina and Carreiras are the mayors of the neighboring municipalities, individuals
were likely to have been in contact with their work and be able to evaluate them. Nonetheless,
these questions were included in order to measure the individuals’ perception of the typical
mayor’s level of honesty and competence. The two mayors are supported by the two main
political parties in Portugal, which allows to control for partisan bias in the evaluations.
The other half of survey respondents answered the questions on the evaluation of politi-
cians and voting choices without having read the news articles. These were considered to be
part of the control group whereas those who answered the questions having read the news
articles were considered to be in the honesty, competence or placebo treatment groups.
Finally, the respondents were asked to report their voting choices in the last three local
elections and frequency of vote for Isaltino Morais in the past, as the 2017 elections marked
the 8th time Isaltino ran for mayor in Oeiras.
This experiment’s intent was to understand how the evaluations of honesty and compe-
tence related to the individuals’ information and voting choice, and to understand if providing
information on the corrupt behaviour of the mayor or on the economic and social situation of
Oeiras, as a proxy for Isaltino’s competent action as a mayor, would have an impact on the
voter’s evaluation of honesty and competence of the mayor, and possibly of other politicians.
When the surveys carried face-to-face, the first part was asked and filled by the inter-
viewers. The evaluation and vote choices were filled by the respondent in a paper she would
then fold and place in a black closed box (similar to an urn).14
14Occasionally, illiterate individuals or individuals that suffered from eyesight problems would not be able
to fill the survey by themselves and all questions were read to them.
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5 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 comprises summary statistics of the individuals’ information, the individuals’ evalu-
ation of the two characteristics for the four politicians and past voting choices. Tables 7 and
8 (Appendix) illustrate more detailed statistics.
The average sampled individual is 43 years old and has lived in the municipality for 26
and a half years. The prevailing age group is from 20 to 23 years old. Almost half of the
sample (45.1%) resides in the parish of Oeiras e São Julião da Barra, the most populated of
Oeiras. About one in every two respondents is either married or cohabiting.
The majority of the respondents (56.4%) holds a university degree, followed by those who
have completed secondary education. With regards to income, close to 40% of our sample
has an average monthly gross income between e591 and e1700 and the second largest group
has an income below e590, approximately the national minimum income. The two upper
income groups are composed almost solely of university graduates. More than half (55.7%) of
the sample is employed, around 18.7 percent is retired and slightly less is currently studying.
The value of honesty variable details how many of the nine points to be distributed
between honesty and competence were attributed to honesty. The vast majority gave either
4 points to honesty and 5 to competence or vice-versa. There is a small difference in the
mean disclosing that, on average, subjects claim to give primacy to honesty.
Regarding the perceived honesty and competence of the politicians, we can observed that:
(i) Average honesty evaluation of the three politicians (Vistas, Medina and Carreiras) was of
2.43, higher than the evaluation of Isaltino’s honesty (1.77); (ii) The opposite is verified for
competence: the competence evaluation of Isaltino Morais (3.17) is higher than the average
competence of the three other politicians (2.44); (iii) The evaluation of Paulo Vistas was
below the mean competence and honesty given to other politicians; (iv) The evaluation of
Isaltino of those who voted for him in 2017 is higher than of those who did not, both for
competence (3.65 points versus 2.94) and for honesty (2.41 versus 1.47 points).
About a third of the sample, 31.2%, elected IN-OV, the independent list headed by
Isaltino Morais. Paulo Vistas, leading the IOMAF movement, was voted by 15.3% of the
individuals. Abstention counted for almost a tenth of individuals, a much lower percentage
than the municipality’s registered rate of abstention of 44.5% (SGMAI 2017).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sampled population




age 552 43.438 18.534 18 88
female 557 0.522 0.500 0 1
years in Oeiras 556 26.541 16.207 0 86
employed 555 0.557 0.497 0 1
schooling
none/primary 555 0.124 0.330 0 1
basic 555 0.101 0.301 0 1
secondary 555 0.211 0.409 0 1
university 555 0.564 0.496 0 1
income
>590 478 0.276 0.448 0 1
590-1700 478 0.452 0.498 0 1
1701-3380 478 0.168 0.374 0 1
3381-6720 478 0.075 0.264 0 1
<6720 478 0.0293 0.169 0 1
family
composition
married 555 0.483 0.500 0 1
children 555 0.593 0.492 0 1
# children 326 1.950 0.854 1 5
value of honesty 555 4.681 1.285 0 9
politicians’
evaluation
Isaltino Competence 551 3.171 0.872 1 4Honesty 550 1.771 0.911 1 4
Vistas Competence 537 2.233 0.787 1 4Honesty 534 2.292 0.880 1 4
Medina Competence 490 2.649 0.836 1 4Honesty 490 2.582 0.847 1 4
Carreiras Competence 434 2.521 0.790 1 4Honesty 429 2.410 0.755 1 4
voting choices: 2017 elections
IN-OV (IM) 557 0.312 0.464 0 1
IOMAF (PV) 557 0.153 0.360 0 1
PS 557 0.054 0.226 0 1
PSD 557 0.115 0.319 0 1
Other 557 0.097 0.296 0 1
Blank 557 0.063 0.243 0 1
Abstention 557 0.0952 0.294 0 1
Couldn’t vote 557 0.004 0.060 0 1
N/A 557 0.108 0.310 0 1
At last, in Table 2, we show balance tests across the four groups for the main baseline
variables. We can observe that, in comparison to the control group, subjects that were in
the honesty treatment group, valued more honesty, in terms of competence, a difference that
is significant at the 5% level. Other minor differences were found in variables other than
the main ones, such as frequency of volunteer work, working in the agricultural industry,
belonging to a specific income bracket and matrimonial situation of cohabitation. These were
included as control variables in the regressions estimated. Given that this information was
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collected before treatment, therefore unaffected by it, and that the treatments were allocated
at random, the differences found across the groups can only be a product of chance.
Table 2: Balance tests for the main variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control Hon C vs Hon Comp C vs Comp Pla C vs Pla
age 41.82 44.42 -2.60 46.14 -4.32 44.40 -2.59
(18.49) (18.07) (0.22) (18.67) (0.06) (18.89) (0.26)
female 0.53 0.53 0.00 0.46 0.07 0.55 -0.02
(0.50) (0.50) (0.97) (0.50) (0.25) (0.50) (0.77)
years in Oeiras 25.83 26.75 -0.93 27.90 -2.08 27.03 -1.21
(16.68) (16.14) (0.62) (15.62) (0.28) (15.57) (0.53)
employed 0.58 0.62 -0.04 0.46 0.12 0.51 0.07
(0.49) (0.49) (0.44) (0.50) (0.05) (0.50) (0.26)
education 4.73 4.75 -0.02 4.85 -0.12 4.88 -0.15
(1.52) (1.49) (0.89) (1.53) (0.52) (1.43) (0.41)
income 2.08 2.22 -0.14 2.28 -0.19 2.01 0.07
(0.98) (0.91) (0.25) (1.11) (0.16) (1.00) (0.59)
married 0.45 0.53 -0.08 0.57 -0.12 0.44 0.01
(0.50) (0.50) (0.17) (0.50) (0.06) (0.50) (0.92)
value of honesty 4.62 4.87 -0.25 4.70 -0.08 4.63 -0.01
(1.27) (0.93) (0.04)∗ (1.47) (0.62) (1.46) (0.96)
N 271 102 373 93 364 91 362
Notes: In columns (1), (2), (4) and (6) the mean of the variables for each of the four groups - control group
(C), honesty treatment group (Hon), competence treatment group (Comp) and placebo treatment group (Pla)
- is reported, as well as the standard deviation, in parentheses. In columns (3), (5) and (7) we report the
mean difference between each of the treatment groups and the control group, with the p-value of the t-test
being reported in parentheses.
6 Vote determinants
In order to characterize the Isaltino Morais (IM) voter, the following binomial probit model,
fitted by maximum likelihood, was estimated:
Pr(V oteIMi = 1) = Φ(x′iβ) (1)
Where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. VoteIM is the outcome
variable that indicates which candidate the individual voted for. It was set as a dichotomous
variable and three specifications were implemented, in which the outcome of voting IM is
evaluated against voting for any of the other candidates (vs Others), voting for Isaltino’s
main contender, Paulo Vistas (vs Vistas), or doing anything else, including abstention or
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voting blank (vs All). Finally, x′i corresponds to a vector of case-specific regressors, regarding
individuals’ characteristics and revealing preferences and beliefs, that are now explained.
The variables avg honesty and avg competence correspond to the average of the honesty
and competence evaluations of the three politicians other than Isaltino Morais (Paulo Vistas,
Fernando Medina and Carlos Carreiras). In the model vs Vistas, a variable denoting the
honesty and competence evaluation of Paulo Vistas is included.
The variable value of honesty (in terms of competence) denotes how many points the
individual attributed to honesty. IM honesty and IM competence correspond to the evaluation
of IM’ honesty and competence on a scale of 1 to 4.
The online version of the survey concluded with an open question asking the reason
behind the individual’s vote in the 2017 elections. For those who had voted for Isaltino, one
recurring answer was that only those who live in Oeiras comprehend the benefits of having
Isaltino as a mayor. Thus, we include the variable years in Oeiras, which indicates for how
many years the individual has lived in the municipality. This variable is expected to have a
positive effect on the probability of voting for Isaltino.
Education and income were treated as continuous variables. Education may serve as a
proxy for political awareness. Politically conscious voters are, on average, less likely to sup-
port corrupt politicians than their less informed counterparts. There is no clear expectation
of the effect of income because while some authors argue that the poorer may have less time
and availability to pay attention to the quality of governance, other studies show greater
tolerance for corruption among the upper socio-economic class.15
Marginal effects evaluated at the mean are reported in Table 3. These regressions were
estimated with cluster robust standard errors, clustering for place and date of survey.
The data show that higher perceived honesty of other politicians (avg honesty) decreases
probability of voting IM: on average, an increase in one point is expected to decrease chances
of voting by 16.2 percentage points. This is only significant for the vs Others model where all
explanatory variables are included. Hence, when individuals believe other politicians to be
more corrupt, they are less likely to vote for Isaltino. This runs contrary to existing findings
that showed that audits proving a politician had not engaged in corrupt behaviours actually
enhanced her chances of re-election, i.e., voters expected, to some degree, all politicians to
15Klasnja 2011; Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013
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Table 3: Vote determinants (probability of voting for Isaltino Morais)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
vs Others vs Others vs Others vs Vistas vs All
avg honesty 0.0158 -0.1007 -0.1619* -0.0623
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
avg competence -0.1089* -0.1636** -0.1491* -0.0914*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
value of honesty -0.0977*** -0.0707*** -0.0805*** -0.0395* -0.0533**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
education -0.1314*** -0.0860** -0.0551* -0.0252 -0.0339*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
years in Oeiras -0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0043** -0.0017 -0.0021
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
employed 0.0139 -0.0487 0.0281 -0.1194 -0.0400
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
age 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0029 -0.0008 0.0020
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
female 0.0552 0.0525 0.0447 0.0428 0.0789
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
IM honesty 0.3012*** 0.3199*** 0.2678*** 0.2084***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
IM competence 0.3003*** 0.2971*** 0.2356*** 0.2276***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)






N 385 382 336 211 400
Notes: These regressions controls for the variables that were unbalanced across the groups. The
results reported are the marginal effects evaluated at the mean. Standard errors clustered by date
and place of survey are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001
be corrupt and would reward those who were not (Ferraz and Finan 2008). Our results show
that believing other politicians are more dishonest does not increase the likelihood of voting
for Isaltino.
When perceived competence of other politicians (avg competence) decreases by 1 point, the
probability of having voted for IM increases by 9.1 to 16.4 p.p.. The coefficient is statistically
significant at 1 to 5 percent level. Therefore, the more one believes other politicians are not
competent, the more probable it is that she supports IM, suggesting that his supporters see
him as exceptionally competent.
We can observe, in the vs Vistas model, that an increase by 1 point in the evaluation of
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Vistas’ honesty decreases probability of voting for Isaltino by about the half the percentage
points of an equal increase in the competence evaluation, 11.5 versus 26.6 percentage points,
or an increase in one point of IM’s honesty or competence. When we compare those who
voted for Isaltino with those who voted for Paulo Vistas, we can see the honesty level of
the main contestant is less significant than his competence or the competence or honesty of
Isaltino in determining vote decisions.
The coefficients of IM honesty and IM competence are positive and significant, at a low
significance level across all specifications, indicating these characteristics are important fac-
tors for his reelection. As these variables may be affected by the treatment, we shown in Table
10 (Appendix) regressions including interactions between receiving one of the treatments and
the honesty and competence evaluations, which hold similar results.
The result of the value of honesty (in terms of competence) is as anticipated: as one
values honesty more, one is less likely to elect Isaltino. One additional point to honesty
corresponds to a decrease in the probability of voting between 7.1 to 9.8 percentage points
(vs Others model). We can also observe, in Table 5, that an additional point to honesty (in
terms of competence) is related a decrease in about 0.14 points in the evaluation of Isaltino’s
competence, a result that is significant at the 0.1% level.
The variable years in Oeiras is only significant in the vs Others specification, when all
variables are included. Contrary to expectations, it is negatively related to voting for IM.
We find no relation between employment status, age or gender and voting decision.
Finally, we encounter an inverse relationship between socio-economic status and support-
ing IM: higher levels of education and income are correlated to a decrease in the probability
of voting for Isaltino and are statistically significant across all specifications, except for the vs
Vistas model. Furthermore, in Table 5 we can see that education is associated with a lower
evaluation of Isaltino’s honesty meaning those who are more educated are more skeptical of
the politician’s honesty level. Regarding education, our results are in accordance with the
previous literature. In Table 9 (Appendix) these are treated as binary variables, showing
results consistent with the ones depicted in Table 3.
We can conclude, firstly, that, although the election of Isaltino Morais is remarkable given
the particular circumstances of Oeiras, one of the most educated and wealthiest municipalities
in the country, our results show that it is neither the richest, nor the most educated in the
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municipality that support Isaltino Morais.
Secondly, we find significant support for the trade-off hypothesis. It is shown that per-
ceived competence is a crucial aspect of his support, and, most importantly, that those who
attribute more importance to competence (in terms of honesty) and believe other politicians
are less competent are those who vote for IM. These results provide evidence that competence,
defined throughout the survey as the provision of goods and services, moderates punishment
for the politician’s misconduct allowing his election, i.e., the perception of Isaltino Morais as
an exceptionally competent mayor explains his success.
7 Treatment effects
To estimate the treatment effects of the survey-embedded experiment, the following model
was estimated using OLS:
Oi = β0 + β1 · t(honesty) + β2 · t(competence) + β3 · t(placebo) + ε (2)
Where Oi corresponds to the main outcome of interest, the evaluation of Isaltino Morais in
terms of honesty and competence, on a scale of one to four. t(honesty), t(competence),
and t(placebo) are indicator variables, equal to one if the individual received the honesty,
the competence, or the placebo treatment, i.e., if the subject read one of the three types of
news articles before answering questions on the evaluation of the politicians. If the subject is
part of the control group, the three binary variables are equal to zero. The coefficients β1, β2,
and β3 measure the honesty, the competence, and the placebo treatment effect, respectively.
In addition to the baseline regression 2, other regressions were run, including variables
such as years living in Oeiras, income, education, value of honesty in terms of competence,
in addition to gender, age and employment status. These were estimated with cluster robust
standard errors, clustering for place and date of survey, if conducted face-to-face, and for
taking the survey online.
We find statistically significant effects of the treatments. We can observe in Table 4 that
the competence treatment affects the individual’s perception of Isaltino’s level of competence.
However we also find effects of receiving the placebo treatment, meaning it was not, in fact,
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Table 4: Treatment effects on Isaltino’s honesty and competence evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IM hon IM hon IM hon IM comp IM comp IM comp
t(honesty) -0.1104 -0.0981 -0.1021 0.0781 0.1149 0.1246
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
t(competence) 0.0275 0.0903 0.1074 0.1397* 0.1718* 0.1831*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
t(placebo) -0.0205 0.0107 -0.0019 0.1732** 0.1930* 0.1900*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
years in Oeiras 0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0026 -0.0034
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
income -0.0315 -0.0843 0.0095 -0.0112
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
education -0.2372*** -0.2245*** -0.0360 -0.0321
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
value of honesty -0.0543 -0.0618* -0.1051* -0.1097**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
N 535 463 461 536 464 462
Notes: The regressions control for the variables that were unbalanced across the groups, as well as age,
employment status and gender for regressions (3) and (6). Standard errors clustered by date and place of
survey are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
a placebo treatment. We can only speculate about why we find a significant effect.16
We do not find effects of any of the treatments when we run the same regression having
as outcome variables the honesty and competence evaluations of the other politicians.
As we cannot fully grasp the reason behind the placebo treatment effects, we continue
to assess the experiment’s results by excluding from the analysis the individuals that were
subject to the placebo treatment. When we run the regression on this restricted sample, we
find effects of the competence treatment. As shown in Table 5, reading the news about the
situation of Oeiras increases the evaluation of Isaltino’s competence by 0.14 to 0.19 points, a
result significant at the 5 percent level for all specifications used. We also observe that the
honesty treatment, which referred directly to Isaltino, has no effect on either the evaluation
of honesty or competence.
Finally, we conducted tests for localized treatment effects on the restricted sample. The
treatment effects for the subsamples, selected according to the variables that we found sig-
nificant in the Vote Determinants section, are summarized in Table 6.
16For instance, when Isaltino was released from prison, it was reported he was visibly slimmer, and he
declared he exercised while imprisoned (Correio da Manhã 2014). Voters may associate news articles on
the benefits of exercise with a positive assessment of Isaltino’s work. It can also be that the placebo news
distracted or relaxed the respondent resulting in more sincere survey answers.
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Table 5: Treatment effects on Isaltino’s honesty and competence evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IM hon IM hon IM hon IM comp IM comp IM comp
t(honesty) -0.1078 -0.0958 -0.1014 0.0861 0.1316 0.1403
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
t(competence) 0.0290 0.0953 0.1227 0.1435* 0.1776* 0.1908*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
years in Oeiras 0.0022 0.0018 -0.0031 -0.0039
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
income -0.0459 -0.0770 0.0249 0.0184
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
education -0.2444*** -0.2487*** -0.0550* -0.0525
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
value of honesty -0.0369 -0.0457 -0.1303** -0.1419***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
N 449 390 388 452 393 391
Notes: These regressions control for the variables that were unbalanced across the groups, as well as age,
employment status and gender in regressions (3) and (6). We exclude from the analysis the placebo treated
individuals. Standard errors clustered by date and place of survey are reported in parentheses. Significance
levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
We find that the treatment effect on the competence evaluation is driven by those who
value honesty (in terms of competence) bellow the average. For these, receiving the com-
petence treatment increases the competence evaluation by to 0.32 points, and the honesty
evaluation by an even larger ammount of 0.42 points. Furthermore we observe that for these
voters, who attribute more importance to competence than the average individual in the
sample, the honesty treatment has a positive effect (of 0.39 points) on the evaluation of
competence, an effect that is not present for the whole sample.
We also observe that if the period of time living in Oeiras is shorter than the sample’s
average, there is a significant positive effect of the competence treatment on both the honesty
(0.29 points) and the competence evaluation (of around 0.23 points).
Finally, and contrary to expectations, the treatment effects are driven by the part of the
sample that is the most educated. Only for those who have a college degree does the compe-
tence treatment have a positive impact on both the honesty and the competence evaluations,
of 0.29 and 0.19 points, respectively. Once again, there is a significant positive effect of the
honesty treatment on the perceived competence level, of around 0.24 points.
Nonetheless, we can observe that there are no treatment effects on those whose income
is above average, whereas if income is bellow average there is an increase of 0.26 points on
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Table 6: Treatment effects on Isaltino’s honesty and competence evaluation for the
subsamples
(1) (2)































































Notes: All regressions control for the variables that were unbalanced across the groups and
for a set of demographic, economic and political variables. Standard errors clustered by date
and place of survey are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001.
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the evaluation of competence when the subject receives the competence treatment. We can
conclude that the university graduates category, which corresponds to half of the sample,
encompasses not only the upper socioeconomic class, but is an heterogeneous group.
The fact that we find that for some individuals the honesty treatment actually improves
the competence evaluation might occur because these voters believe that for a condemned
politician to be elected it must mean he his competent, otherwise he would not be in power.
This goes in line with the implicit trading, that corruption’s electoral consequences can be
moderated by the competent work of the politician.
8 Concluding remarks
Our findings present evidence for the implicit trading theory, that is, the theory that voters
tolerate corruption in order to have in office a "competent" politician, who is capable of creat-
ing favourable economic conditions. We can observe that both believing other politicians are
less competent and attributing more value to competence, in terms of honesty, are positively
correlated with supporting Isaltino. Moreover, the presence of competence treatment effects
shows that the Oeiras’ electorate links the social and economic well-being of the municipality
with Isaltino Morais’ ability of providing the desired public goods and services. At last, the
fact that there is a positive effect of the honesty treatment on the competence evaluation,
which is significant for part of the sample, suggests that voters believe that for a candidate
who has been convicted for corruption-related crimes to be elected, she must be competent.
At the same time, the results indicate little explanatory power for the ignorant voter
hypothesis. The Oeiras’ electorate seems to be aware of who they are voting for, as the
information provided about the past crimes and conviction of Isaltino, which was salient,
credible and accessible, does not affect the honesty evaluation.
A distinctive aspect of the study is that it focuses on a real, popular, longstanding politi-
cian and actual elections, versus a hypothetical corrupt candidate and vote intention, as
previous studies have done. Assuming surveyed individuals were truthful, we are able to
analyze actual, not stated, behaviour.
The fact that we use survey data and rely on self-reported behaviour - in lack of another
form of knowing who people voted for - and stated preferences is a vulnerability of our study.
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The individuals’ answers may be subject to, for instance, social desirability bias. When
the survey was not taken online, the most sensitive questions of the questionnaire were self-
administered and placed in a black closed box to lead respondents to disclose their true beliefs
and past behavior. However, this is not a flawless method.
There are further limitations of this experiment. Firstly, we employ a weak treatment,
composed only by information (news articles) which might not be new to the respondents and
might be insufficient to alter one’s behaviour. We also find unexpected placebo treatment
effects, which we find difficult to interpret. Moreover, our data are non-representative, and
it may be that the particular experience of the sampled electorate does not apply to all
Oeiras voters. Finally, this survey was conducted post-elections, and we cannot measure if
the treatment effect would last or if it would impact future voting decision. Nonetheless, this
paper’s aim was not to alter voting choices but to understand previous voting decisions and
explain the electoral success of a particular candidate.
In this study we used education as a proxy for political sophistication, as we focused on
ignorant voter theory and implicit trading (trade-off) theory. Those who are more educated
should be less tolerant to a dishonest politician. Education, measured by the schooling level,
has unpredictable effects: having a college degree is negatively related to supporting Isaltino
Morais, but, at the same time, the treatment effects are driven by these individuals. We
believe this is so because half of the sample are university graduate students, making it an
heterogeneous group.
Hence, for future research, it could be advantageous to cross the measures employed in
this study with specific measures of political sophistication to understand more clearly how
it influences voting decision and perceptions of politicians.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics, individual characteristics (continuation)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 552 43.438 18.534 18 88
female 557 0.522 0.500 0 1
years in Oeiras 556 26.541 16.207 0 86
parish
Algés 557 0.262 0.440 0 1
Barcarena 557 0.054 0.226 0 1
Carnaxide 557 0.147 0.355 0 1
Oeiras 557 0.451 0.498 0 1
Porto Salvo 557 0.086 0.281 0 1
matrimonial status
single 555 0.405 0.491 0 1
married 555 0.382 0.486 0 1
widowed 555 0.036 0.187 0 1
divorced 555 0.112 0.315 0 1
cohabitation 555 0.065 0.247 0 1
children 555 0.593 0.492 0 1
# children 326 1.951 0.854 1 5
job situation
employed 555 0.557 0.497 0 1
unemployed 555 0.079 0.270 0 1
student 555 0.177 0.382 0 1
retired 555 0.187 0.391 0 1
job sector
agriculture 542 0.013 0.113 0 1
industry 542 0.103 0.305 0 1
services 542 0.590 0.492 0 1
public adm 542 0.129 0.336 0 1
other 542 0.164 0.371 0 1
civic participation civic association 556 0.167 0.374 0 1political body 555 0.016 0.126 0 1
volunteer work
never/rarely 556 0.595 0.491 0 1
sporadically 556 0.259 0.438 0 1
often 556 0.083 0.276 0 1
very often 556 0.063 0.243 0 1
religion
not important 555 0.245 0.431 0 1
mildly important 555 0.214 0.411 0 1
important 555 0.335 0.472 0 1
very important 555 0.205 0.404 0 1
value of honesty mayor 555 4.681 1.285 0 9politician 552 4.786 1.222 0 9
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics, past voting choices (continuation)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2013 elections
IOMAF (PV) 557 0.332 0.471 0 1
PS 557 0.110 0.313 0 1
PSD 557 0.068 0.252 0 1
CDU 557 0.025 0.157 0 1
Other 557 0.045 0.207 0 1
Blank 557 0.066 0.249 0 1
Abstention 557 0.106 0.308 0 1
Couldn’t vote 557 0.093 0.291 0 1
N/A 557 0.154 0.362 0 1
2009 elections
IOMAF (IM) 557 0.348 0.477 0 1
PS 557 0.066 0.249 0 1
PSD 557 0.070 0.255 0 1
CDU 557 0.023 0.151 0 1
Other 557 0.027 0.162 0 1
Blank 557 0.029 0.167 0 1
Abstention 557 0.072 0.258 0 1
Couldn’t vote 557 0.206 0.405 0 1
N/A 557 0.158 0.365 0 1
Voted for IM in
past elections
"never" 511 0.464 0.499 0 1
"rarely" 511 0.145 0.352 0 1
"often" 511 0.141 0.348 0 1
"always" 511 0.250 0.433 0 1
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A.2 Vote determinants
Table 9: Vote determinants, education and income as binomial variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
vs Others vs Others vs Others vs Vistas vs All
avg honesty 0.0124 -0.1065 -0.1305* -0.0459
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
avg competence -0.1042* -0.1620** -0.1515** -0.1007**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
value of honesty -0.0916*** -0.0680*** -0.0708*** -0.0390* -0.0536***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
college graduate -0.3625*** -0.2640*** -0.2228*** -0.0616 -0.1664***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
years in Oeiras -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0015
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
employed 0.0107 -0.0373 0.0010 -0.1406* -0.0520
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
age 0.0019 0.0000 0.0019 -0.0003 0.0014
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
female 0.0464 0.0453 0.0358 0.0496 0.0719
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
IM competence 0.3022*** 0.3072*** 0.2843*** 0.2414***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
IM honesty 0.3046*** 0.3031*** 0.2728*** 0.2078***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)






N 385 382 382 242 455
Notes: These regressions control for the variables that were unbalanced across the groups. Standard
errors clustered by date and place of survey are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 10: Vote determinants, including interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
vs Others vs Others vs Others vs Vistas vs All
avg honesty 0.0158 -0.0896 -0.1564** -0.0640
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
avg competence -0.1089* -0.1763** -0.1622** -0.0920*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
value of honesty -0.0977*** -0.0703*** -0.0755*** -0.0332 -0.0509**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
education -0.1314*** -0.0828** -0.0545* -0.0211 -0.0363**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
years in Oeiras -0.0016 -0.0029 -0.0041* -0.0018 -0.0022
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IM honesty 0.3115*** 0.3159*** 0.2860*** 0.1713**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
IM competence 0.2753*** 0.2627*** 0.2255*** 0.2143***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
IM hon (T hon) 0.1133 0.0850 -0.1375 0.2165
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.11)
IM hon (T comp) -0.0767 -0.0240 -0.1013 0.0803
(0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
IM hon (T pla) -0.0623 -0.0387 0.0401 0.0256
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
IM comp (T hon) 0.0039 0.1192 0.2714* 0.1079
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10)
IM comp (T comp) 0.1003 0.1845* 0.0744 0.1006
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
IM comp (T pla) 0.0190 -0.0356 -0.2675 -0.0756
(0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.10)
t(honesty) -0.3239 -0.6392 -0.7083 -0.7795
(0.39) (0.58) (0.45) (0.41)
t(competence) -0.1957 -0.4858* 0.0226 -0.3956
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22)
t(placebo) 0.0049 0.1313 0.8400 0.1852
(0.40) (0.41) (0.65) (0.33)






N 385 382 336 211 400
Notes: All regressions include control for the variables that were unbalanced across the groups as well
as age, employment status and gender. Standard errors clustered for the date and place of survey are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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A.3 Treatment effects
Table 11: Treatment effects on voting report of 2017 elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
vs Vistas vs Vistas vs Others vs Others vs All vs All
t(honesty) -0.1232 -0.0487 -0.1095 -0.0541 -0.0877 -0.0360
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
t(competence) -0.0765 0.0043 -0.0700 0.0335 -0.0417 0.0602
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
t(placebo) -0.0753 -0.0485 -0.0467 -0.0425 -0.0548 -0.0152
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
N 254 221 395 347 478 419
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: All regressions controls for the variables that were unbalanced across the groups as well as
age, gender and employment status, plus a set of demographic, economic and political controls for
regressions (2), (4) and (6). Standard errors clustered by date and place of survey are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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